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United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was born out of a national security need to unify interagency and interstate efforts to defend our nation from attack or overwhelming natural disaster. Like all combatant commands, USNORTHCOM is an active duty command. As a result, many of the cultural biases and tensions between active and reserve component forces permeate the working relationships between USNORTHCOM and the broader National Guard community. 3 From its inception, USNORTHCOM has struggled to define legitimate roles for itself with the governing states and the National Guard forces that are available for disaster response. The purpose of this research paper is to review the historical roles and responsibilities of the National Guard and the United States Army and propose unity of effort options available to USNORTHCOM. This paper will examine the interrelated legal and political tensions that result from the Constitutional division of federal and state powers relating to national defense. It concludes with a recommended command option to improve unity of effort between USNORTHCOM and the National Guard.
Thesis
The National Guard is the primary Department of Defense agency for domestic disaster relief. In most situations, the National Guard is called to military service as a state asset under the control of state governors. In order to fully understand the unity of effort controversy that exists between federal and state authorities regarding domestic security, it is important to review the historical context that gave birth to both the National Guard and USNORTHCOM while also examining their respective state and federal roles and responsibilities. The need for better interagency and interstate coordination became apparent at 8:46 on the morning of September 11, 2001 when an airliner, traveling hundreds of miles per hour, carrying over 10,000 gallons of jet fuel, flew into the North Tower of the World Trade Center.
Less than 10 minutes later, a second airliner hit the South Tower. Both buildings in New York City collapsed from the resulting fire less than 90 minutes later. soldiers on duty before transferring responsibility to the newly established Transportation Security Administration.
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In response to these events, the National Guard, in coordination with federal authorities, effectively deterred threats and helped restore public confidence in air traffic security. The quick response was due in part because the National Guard has armories already forward deployed across the homeland. Not only is their basing convenient, but there are a number of other advantages the National Guard brings to disaster response beyond just providing the bulk of forces to USNORTHCOM. For instance, the National
Guard often provides local communities with additional medical officers or civil engineers during local disasters.
Significance of this Research
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently issued a special report requested by a bipartisan, bicameral group of legislators, that raised concerns about the fundamental operations at USNORTHCOM. The GAO found that despite some progress, USNORTHCOM still lacks sufficient experience dealing with individual states and does not understand the differing states' National Guard capabilities and emergency management structures. Admiral Timothy Keating, USNORTHCOM's previous commander, stated in 2005 that he had little sense of the National Guard capabilities beyond the number of troops being deployed during the response to Hurricane Katrina. 6 The GAO report also found that USNORTHCOM does not consistently involve states in major command readiness training, such as disaster planning exercises, and must improve its ability to share key information such as lessons learned and after action reports. 7 After reading the GAO report, United States Senator Kit Bond, Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee noted, "This report underscores the need for USNORTHCOM to coordinate with and support the state, local officials and guardsmen who know their own backyards better than anyone else." Senator Bond went on to say, "The citizen soldiers and airmen in the National Guard are not only highly trained for disaster mitigation and homeland defense, but also are members of the impacted communities which they serve." 8 The strategy for homeland defense and civil support recognizes that there should be a "focused reliance" on the reserve components for homeland defense and civil support activities. 9 After all, the National Guard will probably have the nearest troops to any domestic incident due to their community basing throughout the United States.
10
Two such historical advantages is the National Guard experience in working with first responders and also their familiarity with local conditions both pre and post disaster.
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Although the majority of USNORTHCOM domestic homeland security missions require the use of the National Guard, less than 10 percent of its military staff and only half the flag officers are currently drawn from the National Guard. USNORTHCOM would greatly benefit from the knowledge and experience of having more reserve members on its primary staff. Instead, most of the senior staff, including the commander at USNORTHCOM, are active duty officers or civilians with little experience or knowledge of the National Guard expertise, capabilities, resources and forces required for domestic response.
The National Guard
The National Guard is the oldest component of the Governor Blanco to appoint an active duty general officer into the Louisiana National Guard in order for him to command and control both federal and state military forces.
The governor declined the president's offer because she did not want to risk forfeiting her constitutional responsibilities to command National Guard forces assigned under her direct control. 22 Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years or both.
To supplement to the Posse Comitatus Act, Congress authorized the Armed We in the military, in looking at the goal of maximum operational effectiveness, routinely try to achieve at least two things: unity of command and unity of effort. The Constitution of the United States was not written to support maximum effectiveness in military operations. The Constitution was written to establish a federal system of government under that document, and that means that inevitably, at the beginning of a domestic military mission, the governors, pursuant to their authorities under the Constitution, will have command and control of their state National Guard forces. The president and the Secretary of Defense, under Article II of the Constitution will command the federal forces. So we start any domestic mission with a breach in that principle of unity of command. Administration to help achieve unity of effort, including the suggestion of establishing a "dual-status" commander who would direct the efforts of both federal and National Guard military forces: 34 The dictionary of terms for the Department of Defense defines unity of command separate and distinct from unity of effort. Appreciating both the difference and the correlation between these two terms is vital to understanding the legal issue of why command and control is less important than the need to improve the unity of effort between USNORTHCOM and the National Guard.
Command and Control: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. 35 Unity of Effort: Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization -the product of successful unified action. 36 
USNORTHCOM Unity of Effort
To fully integrate the reserve components, the 2008 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves recommended three changes in law and policy to improve both command and unity of effort at USNORTHCOM. First, because USNORTHCOM has significant responsibility for domestic emergency response and civil support, a majority of its billets, including those for its service components, should be filled by leaders and staff with reserve qualifications and credentials. 37 In response to this Commission's first recommendation, the Secretary of Defense agreed to review USNORTHCOM billets to determine which positions could be better filled by National Guard and Reserve personnel. Secondly, the Commission recommended that the officer serving in the position of the commander or the deputy commander of USNORTHCOM should always be a National Guard or Reserve officer. 38 The The second option uses a hybrid federal coordinating command authority that mirrors the command structure of the first option but also allows for a flexible chain of command structure that is dependent on the crisis at hand. This option allows the current active duty commander of USNORTHCOM to select from a menu of potential joint task force command structures that suits the immediate planning or crisis action needs should a homeland defense or security issue arise. In keeping with the Secretary of Defense preference, this option allows the USNORTHCOM commander maximum flexibility to select either a dual status National Guard joint service subordinate commander or federal status joint service commander as needed. In the event of federal activation and mobilization of National Guard forces under Title 10, United
States Code, unity of command is also achieved by integrating these forces into the USNORTHCOM chain of command. However, political unity of effort is again risked by removing the states' governor from the National Guard chain of command.
This political risk for the second option could be mitigated by appointing a National Guard lieutenant general as the commander of US Army North (ARNORTH).
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